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THE PEACE THAT LED TO WAR

T.S.Tsonchev

Why did Europe go to war in 1914 after years of relative peace?

The key to answering this question lies in analyzing the character of the international system in the 19th century.

Why was Europe at peace for most of the 19th century? The school of political realism insists that the international system is always anarchic. The international system is not a hierarchical structure like the domestic system, and it is not subject to any particular legal or predictable order. Liberal political thought does not directly challenge this "realist" approach. The international system of the 19th century was clearly an anarchic system, characterized by the levels of balance of power achieved by the states in Europe. This achievement was the result of the long period of insecurity and wars in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. The French revolutionary wars undermined the European status quo, and after the defeat of Napoleon, the European powers felt an urgent need to create a more secure European order.

This order was forged at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, where Prince Metternich's ideas of "perpetual peace" through concert diplomacy were accepted by the European monarchs. The Concert of Europe was a novelty at the time, and it worked well for a few years. However, this system had a serious flaw: it was a defensive system and served the interests of the great powers only. The goal of the system was not to create peace, but to manage existing conflicts. The concert was played only after a conflict had begun; it was not designed to prevent conflicts before they began.

Political theorist Robert Jervis says that the Concert of Europe was an alliance system in which all countries worked only to prevent one state from dominating the others. War was undesirable because everyone knew that today's enemy could be tomorrow's ally and vice versa. This system was not a system of cooperation, but rather a defensive system to prevent domination.

In sum, the long peace of the 19th century was due to the character of the international system - alliances against the domination of one state, conflict management, and well-learned lessons from the Napoleonic wars.

Of course, there were other factors that prevented an aggressive foreign policy. Domestic issues were a major factor: the threat and fear of social revolutions (such as the Paris Commune) or the energy expended in nation-building (Germany and Italy). Britain's undisputed naval supremacy was also a factor in securing peace, as was the rise of world trade, globalization, and the Industrial Revolution.

But why was this peace doomed? The alliance system was a negative concept. It was a concerted action against already existing dangers. War was neither eradicated nor prevented, and it was considered inevitable. No one in the Concert believed in the real possibility of a lasting peace. Everyone expected war, sooner or later, and the European powers were preparing for it. As Paul Kennedy noted, there was a constant military race during the 19th century, and the pace of militarization doubled after 1900. In addition, the initial commercial cooperation was fading, and the Depression that began in the mid-1870s made the industrialized nations nervous and determined to expand their imperial dominions.

Weltpolitik became popular in Germany; some historians argue that the conservative imperial government invented this concept in response to the challenges of the Industrial Revolution and the growing influence of the Social Democrats. Weltpolitik called for a larger German navy and a stronger army. It also demanded an active imperial policy. The Germans began to build a fleet, and the British immediately recognized this as a threat to their naval superiority. The German Emperor William II ended the alliance with France, and his boastful nationalism brought Russia and France closer, eventually making them allies. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the balance of power in Europe had already been violated. The cult of the offensive became the foreign policy gospel of the continental powers. There was a false impression among European politicians that military power alone was enough to ensure global position and security. All governments were prepared for war, and all thought that whoever struck first would have the advantage.

Paul Kennedy says that on the eve of World War I, no one expected a long conflict. None of the European governments was able to realize the power of technological change in the military, and no one counted the real economic price of a possible European conflict.

All these factors combined to create an explosive situation that finally exploded in 1914.Montreal Review


Related articles:

In Defence of Perpetual Peace

First World War and Versailles - The Lessons

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Read in depth:

Richard B. Elrod, The Concert of Europe: A Fresh Look at an International System , World Politics, Vol. 28, No. 2 (Jan., 1976), pp. 159-174. The Johns Hopkins University Press

Bernadotte E. Schmitt, The First World War, 1914-1918 , Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. 103, No. 3 (Jun. 15, 1959), pp. 321-331. American Philosophical Society

James R. Sofka Metternich's Theory of European Order: A Political Agenda for "Perpetual Peace", The Review of Politics, Vol. 60, No. 1 (Winter, 1998), pp. 115-149. Cambridge University Press for the University of Notre Dame du lac on behalf of Review of Politics

Paul M. Kennedy, The First World War and the International Power System, International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer, 1984), pp. 7-40

Robert Jervis, From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation, World Politics, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Oct., 1985), pp. 58-79

Henry A. Kissinger, The Congress of Vienna: A Reappraisal, World Politics, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Jan., 1956), pp. 264-280

Richard Langhorne, Reflections on the Significance of the Congress of Vienna, Review of International Studies, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Oct., 1986), pp. 313-324

David E. Kaiser, Germany and the Origins of the First World War, The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 55, No. 3 (Sep., 1983), pp. 442-474

David French, The Edwardian Crisis and the Origins of the First World War, The International History Review, Vol. 4, No. 2 (May, 1982), pp. 207-221

Stephen Van Evera, The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War, International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer, 1984), pp. 58-107

 
 
 
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