German History Journal

Wilhelmine Germany: realities and interpretations*

The Montreal Review, January, 2010

Historians often think of Wilhelmine Germany through the lens of the great wars of the twentieth century, and the question they argue about is whether the prewar German political, social, and economic system was responsible for both the outbreak of World War I and the rise of the Nazis.

| 1 OF 2 | NEXT

How did German politics change under Wilhelm II? There are two equally valid answers: it changed a lot, and it stayed the same - Wilhelm II had abandoned the traditional cautious policies of Bismarck that had elevated the German nation to the level of a great power, but he preserved the Prussian martial spirit that Bismarck's political genius had ignited. He wanted to be a "social emperor," or a leader of all Germans, but in succeeding as such a leader, Wilhelm preserved the rigidity of the German social and political system inherited from Bismarck's anti-democratic domestic policies.

In 1890, the Kaiser dismissed Bismarck as Chancellor and announced: "The course of the ship remains the same. "Full steam ahead" is the order. 1 The last sentence shows how reckless and dangerously overconfident the new Kaiser's policies would be without the restraint of Bismarck's powerful and cold-blooded personality.  

At the time of Wilhelm II, Germany was already a powerful state, and it needed gifted politicians and a politically mature society to continue its economic progress and influence international politics in the right direction. Unfortunately, as the majority of historians have argued since the 1960s, following the historical interpretations of Fritz Fischer on Wilhelmine Germany, Germany did not have prudent politicians and mature civil society at the end of the XIX century and the beginning of the XX century.

In the nineteenth century, the European international system still worked according to the principles of Metternich - balance of power, concerted action to prevent major conflicts, and diplomacy, but because of their lack of caution, Wilhelm and his ministers were not the right men for such a skillful policy. After Bismarck, Germany did not renew its alliance with Russia, joined with Austria-Hungary to defend Habsburg interests in the Balkans, and broke the balance of power that kept France and Russia in different camps. His foreign policy was chaotic and irrational. I think this irrationality is the main factor that causes disagreement among historians. Historians, of course, want to find a rational explanation for the reasons that led the world into World War I. They cannot accept Lloyd George's simplistic and actually not far from the truth explanation of the causes of the war: "The nations slithered over the brink into the boiling cauldron of war without any trace of apprehension or dismay...   The nations backed their machines over the precipice... not one of them wanted war; certainly not on this scale..." 2

Well, in the fashion of the time, the Germans, like most European nations, allowed themselves to be deceived for decades by a boastful national propaganda that had unnoticeably transformed itself from an instrument of domestic management into a real foreign policy. There is perhaps no better book to illustrate the absurdity of national propaganda and the comic appearance of social and political moods in Wilhelmine Germany than Heinrich Mann's novel "Der Untertan" (or "The Patriot"). 3

On the domestic front, the Kaiser succeeded in enlisting almost all parties, including the Roman Catholics and the Social Democrats - the parties of the masses - as supporters of his domestic and foreign policies. The long-term consequence of this inclusion was shared responsibility for the outbreak of war in 1914. Not only the political right, but also the center supported the war. The German Social Democrats had the largest socialist party in the world, and its leaders, while generally opposed to the war, felt that if Germany won a European war, its influence would grow, and with it the growth of socialist movements in other industrialized countries. Pre-war support for imperial foreign policy would fuel post-war German distrust of the traditional parties and would be one of the reasons for the political instability of the 1920s and early 1930s. In his " Course of German History " A. J. P. Taylor says "the Centre and the Social Democrats became the political mouthpiece of the army, the defenders of the great estates and of great industry, and the upholders of the 'national' cause." 4

Historians often think of Wilhelmine Germany through the lens of the great wars of the twentieth century, and the question they argue about is: Was the prewar German political, social, and economic system responsible for both the outbreak of World War I and the rise of the Nazis? The historical debate over these questions helps to illuminate the character of the Second Reich, layer by layer.

| 1 OF 2 | NEXT

***

Related articles:

The Origins of the Second World War

First World War and Versailles - The Lessons

The Peace that led to War

***

* This article doesn't pretend for historical accuracy. It is based on dilettante notes on German history readings.

1 Taylor, A. J. P., Course of German History, The: A Survey of the Development of German History Since 1815 (Taylor & Francis, 2001),

2David Lloyd George, War Memoirs (1934)

3 Mann, Heinrich, The loyal subject (Continuum International Publishing Group, 1998).

4 Taylor, A. J. P., Course of German History, The: A Survey of the Development of German History Since 1815 (Taylor & Francis, 2001), (15 January 2010)

***

Dear Reader, if you wish to comment this article or express different opinion, please feel free to write to themontrealreview@gmail.com or use Sidewiki.

All comments, opinions and suggestions will be published within a month after their submission.

All letters should include your name, postal address, and daytime phone number. Letters may be edited for length and clarity.