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BREAKING THE BASTION
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By
Mohammad Aslam
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The Montréal Review, May 2011
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As popular patience for democratic change in the Arab world overflows into insurrection, a toppled Saudi regime maybe the penultimate satisfaction for a people long subdued by a culture of tyranny and oppression.
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Saudi Arabia's House of Saud, long seen as the bastion of absolute rule in the region, is a complicated monarchy indeed. It is propped up by controlling the worlds largest oil reserves, rules as a quasi-theocracy, is restrictive and conservative - but filthy rich. Moreover, by default its patriarch assumes the title of the Custodian of the two holy places, sacred to the Islam's estimated 1.5 billion adherents worldwide.
Given its central importance in the Arab/Islamic world, the relativity of its oil production to the world economy and the fact that this country has been a major recruiting ground of the now dead Osama Bin Laden and many of his sycophants the stability of Saudi Arabia and its influence in the region is vital.
But democratic aspiration is nothing new to this petro-dollar soaked Kingdom. If anything, it is an old idea with a new inspiration: the revolt of the Arab masses.
Since the events that culminated in the overthrow of the former Tunisian dictator Ben Ali, if one leader thought he was immune from this type of popular anger and indifference, it was the King of Saudi Arabia. After all, big brother is a ruler who has vehemently articulated his support for every Arab ruler since the ouster of Tunisia's former leader, whom he ultimately gave sanctuary.
The riots which began two months ago in the Shiite majority east of Saudi Arabia were no doubt a wake up call to the ruling family. These were no ordinary protests. They were the latest, in a series of sporadic actions over the years that call for democratic representation and the release of detainees. These latest events quickly became a popular protest under the banner of a Facebook "Day of Rage"- an event seldom seen in the authoritarian kingdom.
It is no secret that social revolutions and strikes make autocratic regimes nervous. It doesn't help when you're an absolute monarchy, and always been that way, with particulars that have no comparison. As such it is hard not to be disliked- even by your own.
But being autocratic also means that the only viable response to dissent is to crackdown at the first site. That is exactly what they did.
The method was not difficult to pre-suppose. It is believed that up to 10,000 troops, whom the King referred to as "shields of this homeland", were sent in to quell the protests. In this near-police state like kingdom it's impossible to tally the figures of the total dead and wounded. One thing is certain; it would have been a brutal crackdown.
To simultaneously pacify the masses, the King unveiled a financial package of around $37 billion. It was his way of presenting poplar reform and gestures to the public it so tightly controls and thus attempting to stem the possibility of unrest spiralling.
The crackdown and speech of the King in the post March-2011 era were testament that the long history of arbitrarily managing revolt was turning another chapter, the regime was losing confidence.
But it is not the international outcry the regime fears, or even damage to its regional reputation- which has never been popular with the everyday Arab citizen. It is the fact that a segment of its population, namely the Shiites, under whose feet the vast oil reserves are located, refuse to be cowed down and instead perpetuate the biggest challenge to their almost century old rule. The dissent is now spreading to ordinary citizens.
The King is taking things seriously. The sight of Bahrain's notorious security forces being swelled by increments from allied Saudi and other armies in the Gulf to fight a popular uprising, dominated by the Shiite majority, only highlights his resolve to stay in power. To defend himself at home, he is on the offensive next door. But this highlights the reason in many Arab minds for why Saudi Arabia's rulers are the problem.
They are being directly associated with the regions ills, and suspected of spending billions to impede regional democracy, exactly the kind of democracy they don't have, to prop up regimes in order to exert its influence beyond its borders. The logic behind this is that the more quagmires of trouble there are in neighboring countries, the more the Saudi people will be dissuaded from following suit.
The regime speaks of Iranian and Shiite agendas in the Gulf, sectarian instability in its own back yard, chaos in Lebanon, even foreign plots- all designed to sow the seeds of hatred. In reality, it is a sustained effort to stop the influence of regional democratic aspirations- influence that arouses the possibility of slowly sweeping it from power.
The thought of popular movements developing a distinctive anti-regime coloration is a terrifying one indeed.
The fall of Saudi Arabia may at last give hope to a region long under-developed and autocratic, give popular hope to Arab aspirations for controlling their own lives, greater religious freedoms, human rights and even utilizing the countries resources for the benefit of the Arab nation.
Being the centre of the Arab and Islamic world, and the most oil-rich, the fall of this regime may finally be the domino effect needed to free the people from decades of despotism. If Big Brother can fall, little brother will follow.
If demonstrations continue and ultimately pick up momentum, perhaps the only recourse to short term survival maybe to go down the road of becoming a constitutional monarchy.
But therein lies the problem.
Absolute rulers, by virtue of their very nature, will go to the ends of the earth to quell threats to their rule. If the House of Saud concedes to popular demand by becoming a constitutional monarch, there is an inescapable conclusion. It means their destiny will be in the hands of the people - something which they will never accommodate.
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Mohammad Aslam
is a PhD candidate in Political Violence at the Department of Middle-East & Mediterranean Studies, King's College London.
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